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The New Insurance Supervisory Landscape:
Implications for Insurance and Pensions
Peter A. Fisher

The supervisory landscape for insurance is becoming considerably more
complex and inﬂuential in the wake of the global ﬁnancial crisis. New
authorities have been created, new powers granted, and the scope of oversight broadened. The intent of the new apparatus is to ensure greater
ﬁnancial stability, improved market conduct, and greater standardization
across legal jurisdictions—and many of these beneﬁts have been realized. At
the same time, the connections and rules of engagement between supervisory authorities are frequently unclear, supervisory mandates sometimes
overlap, and the intended policy objectives can be pursued despite signiﬁcant unintended consequences and negative effects on other dimensions of
social welfare.
This chapter ﬁrst outlines the new supervisory landscape in North America,
Europe, and globally, with a particular focus on insurance oversight and
implications for pension policy. It then explores a series of speciﬁc supervisory issues that have received special attention since the ﬁnancial crisis and
identiﬁes recent supervisory developments. The effects of supervisory activities on market structure, conduct, and performance are then examined,
with follow-on identiﬁcation of potential effects on several dimensions of
social welfare. A series of speciﬁc examples is used to illustrate connections
between immediate policy objectives and sometimes ambiguous effects on
net social welfare. Finally, a forward-looking view is provided, identifying
future challenges and issues on the horizon.

Current Supervisory Landscape
The supervisory structures overseeing insurance and pensions exist at multiple geographic levels: provincial, national, regional, and global (see
Figure 2.1). This supervisory apparatus is responsible for implementing
and overseeing regulations to ensure adequate solvency, good market conduct, ﬁnancial stability, and effective governance and risk management.
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Figure 2.1 Insurance regulatory/supervisory structures
Notes: For additional detail and explanation, please see the ‘Glossary of Terms.’
Source: Author’s contribution.

International overview
North America
The US supervisory structure is foundationally state-based. Each state has a
dedicated insurance commissioner overseeing insurance market activity
within its own borders, and each commission has primary oversight over
insurers domiciled within its state. State-level commissioners have a dual
supervisory mandate to ensure the solvency of insurers and the protection of
policyholders. Unlike many other country-level systems, the state-based US
system does not directly address group-level issues but focuses instead primarily on state-level and subsidiary-level oversight and policy. Augmenting
the state-level system is the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), which acts to coordinate and, to some extent, standardize,
the state-level activities of individual commissioners. The NAIC is the US
standard-setting and regulatory support organization created and governed
by the chief insurance regulators from the 50 states, the District of Columbia,
and ﬁve US territories. Through the NAIC, state insurance regulators
establish standards and best practices, conduct peer reviews, coordinate their
regulatory oversight, and represent the collective views of state regulators
domestically and internationally. The NAIC’s mission includes protecting
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the public interest, ensuring competitive markets, protecting insurance
consumers, and promoting the ﬁnancial stability and solvency of insurance
institutions. The NAIC is a voluntary coordinating organization, without
explicit legal authority over individual state supervisors. While its members
are the insurance commissioners of each state and territory, the NAIC is a
non-governmental organization that concerns itself with insurance regulatory matters but does not actually regulate. In particular, the states have not
delegated their regulatory authority to the NAIC. It also acts as one of the
primary points of engagement for other elements of the US and global
supervisory structure, including the US Federal Reserve, the International
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), and the Financial Stability
Board (FSB).
At the federal level, there are three primary entities: the Federal Reserve,
the Federal Insurance Ofﬁce (FIO), and the Financial Stability Oversight
Council (FSOC). At the national level, the Federal Reserve oversees any
insurer that contains a bank holding company (BHC), has been designated
as systemically important by the Financial Stability Oversight Council, or is a
US domiciled insurer that is considered an Internationally Active Insurance
Group (IAIG).1 The newly created Federal Insurance Ofﬁce, a part of the
US Treasury, does not currently have legal jurisdiction over any element of
the US insurance market, but it is an inﬂuential analyst and evaluator of the
current composite framework. The FIO is currently the US representative at
the IAIS, but it has no parallel domestic supervisory authority. The FIO, in its
recently published modernization report, provided detailed recommendations for supervisory activities that should ideally be administered at one or
more of several levels, including the individual states, the federal level, and
the international level (FIO 2013). Finally, the FSOC has the authority to
designate insurers as systemically important ﬁnancial institutions (SIFI),
depending on their size, complexity, and range of activities. If designated
a SIFI, a new host of regulations then becomes active and primary supervisory oversight transfers to the Federal Reserve.2
The Canadian supervisory oversight resides primarily within the Ofﬁce of
Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI), an independent agency
that reports to the Minister of Finance. In addition to regulating banks, it is
the primary regulator of insurance companies, trust companies, loan companies, and pension plans in Canada. In this capacity, it oversees matters of
solvency, conduct, and ﬁnancial stability at the national level and as a point
of engagement with international initiatives.

Europe
The European supervisory structure has two principal dimensions: one at
the country level and the other at the European regional level. Within each
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country there typically exists one of two structures: (1) a single integrated
supervisor covering conduct, prudential, and systemic oversight; or (2) a
‘twin peaks’ structure that bifurcates conduct and prudential regulation into
two entities, as a structural response to supervisory lessons learned from the
ﬁnancial crisis. An example of the twin peaks structure is the Prudential
Regulatory Authority (PRA) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)
in the United Kingdom. Other country-level entities include Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BAFIN) in Germany, the Autorité de Contrôl
Prudentiel (ACPR) in France, the Autoriteit Financiele Markten (AFM) in
the Netherlands, and the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority
(FINMA).
The primary regional authority for Europe is the European Insurance
and Occupational Pension Authority (EIOPA), a European Union ﬁnancial
regulatory institution composed of representatives from the insurance and
occupational pensions supervisory authorities of the European Union. It was
created following the ﬁnancial crisis to help ensure a more level playing
ﬁeld across the EU and to reﬂect increasingly integrated ﬁnancial markets.
EIOPA carries out a number of signiﬁcant functions including strengthening supervisory colleges and enhancing the prudential regime within the
European Union through the drafting and oversight of the Solvency II
Directive. It is at this level that pan-European regulations and supervisory
oversight are deﬁned, implemented, and enforced.3

Global
At the global level, the primary organizations with signiﬁcant inﬂuence over
supervisory functions are the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). The FSB was created
in the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis to monitor and oversee ﬁnancial institutions and activities to ensure global ﬁnancial stability; it consists at its core of
central banks and treasuries of the G20 countries. This core is augmented by
a variety of additional executive, regulatory, and supervisory institutions.
The IAIS, established in 1994, represents insurance regulators and supervisors of more than 200 jurisdictions in 140 countries, constituting 97
percent of global insurance premiums. It has three pillars of activity, consisting of standard setting, implementation, and ﬁnancial stability for the
global insurance sector.
Most recently, the IAIS and FSB have collaborated closely to develop new
standards around group-level global capital standards and requirements;
group supervision; corporate and risk governance; designation criteria and
supervisory models for global systemically important insurers (GSIIs); recovery and resolution planning; and macro-prudential standards.
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Supervisory issues
Policy objectives of the many supervisory structures span a broad range,
including ﬁnancial stability, market conduct, solvency, organizational governance, and supervisory coordination.

Financial stability and systemic risk
Ensuring global ﬁnancial stability is a top priority within supervisory mandates in the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis, and it is being addressed at the
global and national levels through consideration of organizational size,
complexity, interconnectedness, and type of activities.4 Much of the supervisory mechanics for overseeing systemic risk are in very early stages of
development. These include designation criteria and evaluation process;
oversight of capital, leverage, and liquidity requirements; development of
more intensive supervision standards; and creation of resolution and recovery plans. Designation and supervision of systemic organizations are progressing simultaneously at the global and national levels, with considerable
uncertainty regarding how the range of national and global supervisors will
standardize and coordinate their many designation decisions, oversight
activities, and overlapping mandates.

Conduct/consumer protection
A second top priority emerging from the ﬁnancial crisis is to develop a more
intensive supervisory focus on the market conduct of ﬁnancial institutions so
as to ensure adequate consumer protection. In several countries, this
renewed focus has led to the creation of a new conduct-focused supervisory
body separate from prudential and stability oversight, in order to avoid
potential loss of focus and mixed objectives of an integrated organization.
Examples include the FCA in the UK and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) in the US. The conduct mandate has frequently been
deﬁned very broadly to extend across both retail and institutional markets,
and it has in some cases been deﬁned to include all manner of conduct and
elements of culture within the internal workings of ﬁnancial institutions.

Solvency/funding
One of the most fundamental policy objectives for supervising both insurance and pensions is assuring adequate levels of solvency and funding of
supervised organizations in meeting their expected future liabilities.5 Signiﬁcant recent activity in this area includes the ﬁnalization, early implementation, and drive toward equivalence of Solvency II in Europe under the
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direction of EIOPA, and the NAIC’s related Solvency Modernization Initiative in the US. Each has developed new approaches to accounting standards,
treatment of assets and liabilities in solvency measurements, and standards
for information sharing and organizational governance.

Governance
One of the many contributors to the ﬁnancial crisis—as identiﬁed by
supervisors—was incomplete oversight and capabilities of boards and directors. Supervisors have therefore renewed their focus on the capabilities of
individual board members; the collective capabilities of the full board;
committee structures, responsibilities, and composition; the speciﬁc governance of risk through the creation of new risk committees and Chief Risk
Ofﬁcer (CRO) roles; adequate independence of board members from the
Executive; and more intensive oversight by the board regarding supervisory
matters related to risk, capital, conduct, and solvency.

Coordination
With the multitude of new supervisory authorities at the national, regional,
and global levels, there is a renewed focus on coordinating the many
overlapping mandates. This has met with some success through the activities
of supervisory colleges under the auspices of the NAIC, IAIS, EIOPA, and
other institutions. However, much important work remains to be done.
Supervisory colleges have improved communication and awareness among
the many supervisory authorities to enhance coordination and standardization, but the degree of substantive coordination, mandate clariﬁcation, and
agreement on key areas of policy is still very limited.

Recent Developments
The supervisory structure for insurance has become much more complex
since the ﬁnancial crisis, as authorities work to ensure greater ﬁnancial
stability and enhanced consumer welfare. Commentators have pointed
to a variety of potential supervisory failings during this period including
unclear supervisory mandates, regulatory arbitrage, non-standardized
supervisory deﬁnitions and approaches across jurisdictions, a ‘light-touch’
stance on oversight of ﬁnancial institutions, and less-than-vigorous supervision of interactions between buyers and sellers of ﬁnancial products. Many
of the recent supervisory developments are meant to address these perceived shortcomings.
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United States
The supervisory landscape within the US has been evolving rapidly since the
ﬁnancial crisis. The traditional state-based supervisory system has been
augmented by new federal entities with either direct supervisory authority
or with important inﬂuencing roles. These include the Federal Reserve, the
FSOC, and the FIO. In particular, the FSOC has designated three insurers as
systemically important (AIG, Prudential Financial, MetLife), thereby transferring primary supervisory authority for these institutions to the Federal Reserve
and establishing enhanced capital, liquidity, resolution, and governance
requirements. The potential for being designated systemically important has
also inﬂuenced the business behavior of remaining large insurers with respect
to size, engagement in ‘non-traditional, non-insurance activities’ (NTNIA),
and interconnectedness. As one example, the provision that authorizes
Federal Reserve oversight over any insurer with a bank holding company
within its structure motivated MetLife recently to shed this element of its
operations. In addition, many insurers have largely exited the market for
credit default swaps, considered NTNIA.
The advent of new federal supervisory authorities and new regulations has
injected a degree of tension between state and federal authorities and
somewhat blurred the scope of authority at these two levels. As an example,
the FIO released its long-awaited reports on modernization and improvement opportunities within the state-based system in December 2013 (FIO
2013) and on the general state of the insurance industry and its oversight in
September 2014 (FIO 2014). In its modernization report, the FIO recognized certain ‘limitations inherent in a state-based system of insurance
regulation’ and concluded that ‘the proper formulation of the debate at
present is not whether insurance regulation should be state or federal but
whether there are certain areas in which federal involvement in regulation
under the state-based system is warranted’ (2013: 11). Speciﬁcally, ‘In all
events, federal involvement should be targeted to areas in which that
involvement would solve problems resulting from the legal and practical
limitations of regulation by the states, such as the need for uniformity or the
need for a federal voice in US interactions with international authorities’
(2013: 12).
The report goes on to identify 18 areas which the FIO recommends
for near-term reform by the states, relating to capital adequacy and safety/
soundness, insurer resolution practices, and marketplace regulation. The
modernization report also identiﬁes nine areas where it recommends direct
federal involvement in insurance regulation. The NAIC has vigorously
opposed greater federal involvement in insurance supervision, citing the
effectiveness of the state-based system in meeting local needs and providing
local oversight, and the beneﬁcial coordinating function of the NAIC.
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The NAIC has responded to greater federal supervisory participation by
enhancing its governance structures, solvency standards, and engagement
with federal, regional, and global supervisory authorities.
The supervisory trend within the US appears to be toward greater federalization of oversight, with the expanded authority and footprint of the
Federal Reserve, inﬂuence of the FIO, and engagement of global supervisory authorities by national (vs. state-level) US entities. Growing federal
oversight has at least two parallels within existing insurance markets. First,
the movement toward federal oversight (relative to state-based supervision)
is analogous to the group-level management and capital structures used by
diversiﬁed insurers in the US to aggregate and allocate resources at the
group level as they are needed locally. Second, movement toward federalization within the US in some ways parallels the evolution within Europe
from country-level supervisors to more standardized approaches at the panEuropean level through EIOPA and Solvency II standards. The recent FSB
peer review of US insurance supervision added even greater energy to the
supervisory landscape, with its ﬁndings of greater need within the US market
for (1) regulatory uniformity; (2) enhanced insurance group supervision;
(3) modernization of solvency requirements; and (4) governance and funding reforms (FSB 2013).
Within the next few years, several concrete issues could arise that directly
challenge the evolving structures, with the possibility for one supervisory
entity to establish a clear mandate on a speciﬁc issue, or to strike a compromise that keeps amorphous rules of engagement intact. Examples
include the willingness of US federal and state authorities to implement
and enforce standards of capital, liquidity, and governance established by
the global IAIS/FSB entities. Speciﬁcally, how do IAIS directives get
enforced within the US (the world’s largest insurance market), and to the
extent they are not enforceable, can a global standard be achieved without
substantive participation by the US? Also important are disagreements
between the FSOC and the IAIS/FSB on systemic designation of US domiciled insurers. Speciﬁcally, if the systemic label applied to MetLife recently
via the FSOC were to be overturned, MetLife would remain systemically
important by the FSB designation. So how then would US authorities carry
out the requirements of a global authority in situations where the domestic
process produced a different conclusion regarding systemic importance?
Additionally, there are concerns about the divergent developmental pace
between the Federal Reserve’s creation of capital standards for ﬁrms it
supervises, and that of the IAIS/FSB’s crafting of the Insurance Capital
Standard (ICS) for internationally active insurers, which include several
ﬁrms the Fed also supervises. Another topic of discussion is the layering of
local capital ‘add-ons’ above the level of the ICS standard established by the
IAIS, resulting in a patchwork of local capital standards, undermining the
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beneﬁt of a single global standard and creating an uneven competitive ﬁeld.
These may all be manageable supervisory confrontations, but each would
immediately test the ability of overlapping supervisors to agree, establish a
clear mandate, or compromise on important elements of ﬁnancial sector
performance.
How this supervisory mosaic will settle in steady-state is very unclear at the
moment. What is clear is the greater energy around federalization, centralization, and standardization across multiple supervisory jurisdictions across
both North America and Europe. One possibility is that individual states may
be left with oversight of conduct, policyholder protection, product approvals, rate-setting on required insurance, and solvency considerations to protect local policyholders; with the remaining supervisory responsibilities
aggregated at the national level through the Federal Reserve, an evolving
FIO, and other federal entities.
At a higher level of generalization, the complexity and possibility of
unintended consequences arise from simultaneously developing important
new policies and regulations (e.g., Solvency II, group capital standards,
global capital standards, SIFI designations) while also implementing these
policies through a supervisory structure that is itself being restructured (e.g.,
greater federalization within the US). Accordingly, ambiguity arises both
around the substance of the new policies as well as where authorities lie to
interpret and implement them.

Europe
Considerable regulatory and supervisory change is under way within Europe.
The recent agreement to ﬁnal standards of Solvency II regulation, with
implementation beginning in early 2016, has taken center stage for much
of the past few years. There are many points of intersection and potential
conﬂicts between established Solvency II statutes and other policy areas,
including the development of global capital standards for systemically
important and internationally active insurers (i.e., BCR, HLA, ICS),
accounting standards, valuation methodologies, asset risk-weighting measures, and liability estimation. Any degree of incompatibility between established Solvency II standards and emerging global standards will likely create
confusion, additional compliance and reporting burdens, and possibly
excessive levels of required capital. Alternatively, it is also possible that the
implementation of global capital standards could be an opportunity, if
designed in compatible ways, to effectively standardize around Solvency II
norms, thereby advancing multiple policy objectives. Finally, there is some
concern, particularly within European countries, that the emerging global
capital standards may effectively act as a capital ﬂoor, with local supervisory
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authorities instituting ‘add-on’ requirements that raise the local de facto
standard (e.g., Early Warning Indicators in the UK). This would result in a
non-level competitive ﬁeld, but it may also increase the likelihood and
extent of base-level standards adoption.
A second area of signiﬁcant supervisory change is conduct regulation and
policy. In select European markets such as the UK and the Netherlands,
conduct supervisors were instituted following the ﬁnancial crisis, and they
have taken self-described aggressive stances in redeﬁning the distribution of
rights and responsibilities between buyers and sellers of ﬁnancial products.
Although the most intense focus has been on retail markets, the purview of
many conduct authorities extends both into institutional markets and into
internal organizational behaviors of ﬁnancial institutions. In the UK, conduct authority actions have included (1) examining long-dated ‘back books’
within the insurance sector, (2) instituting a requirement for ‘ﬁt and
proper’ that enables authorities to reject company selections for top board
and executive management posts, (3) creating a requirement that new
directors and executives take a personal oath to uphold the interests of
consumers above other business objectives, and (4) participating in the
recent policy change of removing required annuitization for designated
portions of accumulated pension pots. Compared to supervision of systemic
stability and prudential concerns, there has been very little international
coordination of conduct supervision and regulation. In particular, conduct
seems to persist as largely a local authority protecting the interests of
residents within the domicile of the supervisor. There are, however, early
movements toward a degree of international standardization and coordination on issues of conduct, initially promulgated through ComFrame and
the IAIS subcommittee on market conduct, which is drafting issues papers
and constructing frameworks on policyholder protection policies and devising model approaches to conduct supervision (IAIS 2015). The US Federal
Reserve is also beginning to examine areas of conduct policy for those ﬁrms
under its mandate.

Global
The most important global development is the direct, coordinated engagement of the FSB and IAIS in overseeing issues of global ﬁnancial stability and
the effective oversight of global insurance ﬁrms at the group level.

Financial stability
The FSB, established after the ﬁnancial crisis, has the direct decision-making
authority over designations of GSII ﬁrms, and the development of required
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capital, liquidity, and resolution regulations for those ﬁrms. However, it has
delegated much of the data gathering, methodology development, and
analysis of these issues to the IAIS, which then makes recommendations to
the FSB for ﬁnal decision and implementation.6 Early development of
methodology, designations, and oversight has begun via the FSB/IAIS process, such as GSII designation and the Basic Capital Requirement (BCR).
However, other elements of this process are in very early stages of design,
including the development of Higher Loss Absorbency (HLA) requirements for GSII ﬁrms, the creation of an Insurance Capital Standard (ICS)
that will apply more broadly to all internationally active insurance groups
(IAIG), and methods for recovery and resolution of systemic ﬁrms. As such,
GSII ﬁrms exist in a state of suspended animation, knowing that their
supervisory and competitive landscape will be changed signiﬁcantly, but
not knowing how or when these changes will occur. This creates degrees
of uncertainty for boards, management teams, policyholders, prospective
customers, and investors that can immediately inﬂuence signiﬁcant nearterm decisions.

Mandates and enforcement
A fundamental unknown at the global level of supervision is the extent and
mechanism for enforcement of standards after they are deﬁned and implemented. The FSB and IAIS do not have legal authority over insurers within
any national jurisdiction. It will be incumbent on the national member of
the FSB (e.g., central bank, supervisory authority) to implement and
enforce the FSB/IAIS standards. Under this structure of local jurisdiction,
there will be signiﬁcant scope for local deviation from global standards,
which creates a great deal of uncertainty for ﬁrms in the sector. Additionally,
many of the speciﬁc statutes will be deﬁned and implemented over a lengthy
process, extending under current plans through 2019. Consequently, global
ﬁrms are encountering lengthy periods of supervisory engagement, organizational preparation, future uncertainty, and business model redesign. This
uncertainty extends signiﬁcantly into the designated ﬁrms’ experiences with
policyholders, decisions on product design, long-term strategic direction,
organizational structure and legal entity status, and capital market required
rates of return.
Within the relatively fragmented US supervisory structure, there has been
greater uncertainty and organizational positioning around which elements
of the American system can best engage with global supervisory structures.
The FIO and, to some extent, the Federal Reserve have each been positioning to become the US voice in international supervisory bodies, with the
NAIC acting as the consolidated body within the US to represent state-level
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views. The NAIC’s view, by contrast, is that it should be the primary voice
representing the US in international supervisory bodies.
Currently the FIO sits on the Executive Committee of the IAIS and is
represented within the IAIS Technical Committee developing the ICS. The
Federal Reserve has applied for membership to both the IAIS and its
inﬂuential Executive Committee. Some have speculated that the Fed may
eventually take the place of the FIO within the Executive Committee if it is
not granted membership directly.7 The NAIC is a member of the IAIS and
has observer status at the various committee levels (conferring the opportunity to comment in detail on developing standards), but it is not a member
of the Executive Committee. More recently, the IAIS has proposed ending
the observer role at the IAIS, effectively distancing the NAIC from IAIS
activities, which the NAIC has vigorously opposed (Woodall 2014). Finally,
the Federal Reserve has attempted to unify the US voice in international
venues by ‘acting on the international insurance stage in an engaged partnership with our colleagues from the FIO, the state insurance commissioners, and the NAIC. Our multi-party dialogue, while respectful of each of our
individual authorities, strives to develop a central ‘Team USA’ position on
the most critical matters of global insurance regulatory policy’ (Sullivan
2014: 7).
At both the US and global levels, there is also signiﬁcant uncertainty
regarding the implications of systemic designation. Currently nine ﬁrms
have GSII designations and three US ﬁrms have been designated locally as
systemically important. However, the speciﬁc requirements for capital,
liquidity, risk governance, and supervisory oversight have not yet been
fully articulated, so ﬁrms ﬁnd themselves in the uncomfortable situation of
being members of a select group under speciﬁc criteria, but not knowing
what the long-term requirements or implications will be.

Global capital standards
A very active area globally is the development of new global capital standards. The IAIS/FSB recently released the ﬁrst element in this series, known
as the Basic (or Backstop) Capital Requirement (BCR) for systemically
important insurers. This is meant to be a standardized capital ﬂoor, upon
which an HLA capital add-on will be layered for systemically riskier activities.
The HLA is currently under development, with focus on both the add-on
methodology and the base set of activities on which it will apply. Parallel to
that effort is the development of the more broadly applied Insurance
Capital Standard, which will apply to all IAIGs, approximately 50 of the
largest global insurers.
The ICS will have much more extensive effects, given its broader span of
jurisdiction and application to all internationally active ﬁrms. It is also meant
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to be a more sophisticated measure of capital adequacy relative to the BCR,
which was developed very rapidly, meant to be quite basic (at the lowest
capital level), and therefore considered a somewhat simple but necessarily
quick measure. In particular, the BCR did not incorporate the beneﬁcial
risk reduction inherent in asset-liability matching practices and diversiﬁcation across geographies, product lines, and customer segments; it assumed
ﬂat-line discount rates beyond a 30-year time horizon; and it instituted an
operational risk charge of 12 percent of gross income ﬂowing from asset
management operations. The industry concern now is less with the shortcomings of the BCR and more with the possibility that much of the ICS will
be modeled from the BCR, retaining some of its more primitive features.
The ICS, if retaining these more primitive characteristics, would then have
the capability of (1) adding signiﬁcant new capital charges; (2) shortening
industry time horizons to within 30 years of operations; (3) discouraging
insurer involvement in the asset management sector; and (4) possibly motivating insurers to change legal organizational structure to fall outside the
scope of IAIG designation and thereby not be subject to ICS requirements.
However, a signiﬁcant beneﬁt of a well-designed ICS would be global standardization and comparison of required capital, a presumed reduction in
risks of systemic instability and insolvency, and reduced scope to pursue
regulatory arbitrage.

Effects on Market Structure, Conduct,
and Performance
The ultimate inﬂuence of new regulations and supervisory structures on the
markets for pensions and insurance depends on their propagation through
a network of product manufacturers, distributors, consumers, and supervisory bodies at the local, regional, and global levels. In the ﬁrst instance,
policymakers usually establish requirements on product manufacturers
and distributors to achieve a desired policy objective (e.g., ﬁnancial stability,
enhanced consumer welfare). The ultimate effect of the policy, however,
depends on the action–reaction cycle between each element in the system
until a new equilibrium has been achieved.8 When the market settles, the
initial policy objectives may be achieved (or not), and there may be many
side effects that were either anticipated or not, both in their existence and
magnitude. Much of the current policy debate within evolving insurance
and pension markets centers on the identiﬁcation and quantiﬁcation of
these general equilibrium results, whether the initial policy objectives will be
achieved, and the resulting social welfare outcome.
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Policy objectives are advanced through many levers controlled by
supervisory and regulatory authorities, including capital deﬁnitions and
requirements, risk-weighting of assets, regulation of product design, pricing,
governance practices, and conduct oversight. Yet policy authorities do not
exert direct control over desired outcomes. Financial institutions and others
respond to policy actions through the levers they control, including product
set decisions, product design, pricing, target customer segments, geographic
presence, chosen domicile, legal entity structure, underwriting practices,
risk selection, and investment portfolio decisions. It is the complex interplay
between policy actions, market responses, and ongoing action–reaction
responses that determine whether policy objectives are met and how social
welfare is affected. This complex interplay is depicted in Figure 2.2.
New policy measures are likely to enhance ﬁnancial stability, improve
market conduct, standardize capital measurement and requirements, and
align required levels of capital with measures of assumed risk. It is also
possible for a series of potentially unintended consequences to unfold,
including (1) reduced capital fungibility across geographies and businesses;
(2) lower product availability, altered product structures, and rising product
prices to reduce exposures to newly capital-intensive products; (3) reduced
ﬁrm size for systemically designated institutions and likely exit from some
products, geographies, and customer segments; and (4) reduced availability
and rising prices of income-generating insurance products that are very
Policy Actions
Supervisory Structures
(local, regional, global)

Private Sector Insurers

Market Response
• Product decisions: pricing, design, pricing.
• Customer decisions: target customer, risk
selection, underwriting standards.

• Solvency: capital & liquidity requirements,
capital standards, risk-weighting, investment
guidelines.

• Geographic decisions: geographic presence, • Financial stability: systemic designations,
captial & liquidity requirements, NTNIA
corporate domicile, group vs. subsidiary
treatment, RRP requirements.
structures.
• Investment decisions: asset allocation, time • Consumer protection: conduct policies,
horizons, asset-liability matching, risk/return product & pricing approvals.
profiles.
• Governance & coordination: board
requirements, supervisory colleges, risk
management policies.

Figure 2.2 Industry–policy feedback loops determine social welfare outcome
Source: Author’s contribution.
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useful in shifting longevity and market risk from individuals to risk-efﬁcient
institutions and investors.

Social Welfare Dimensions and Tradeoffs
Much of the regulatory and supervisory structure within the ﬁnancial service
sectors is attempting to improve one or more dimensions of social welfare,
including (1) ﬁnancial stability; (2) individual ﬁrm solvency; (3) macroeconomic growth; (4) adequate returns to investor capital; and (5) direct
consumer welfare (which can be further decomposed into market coverage,
product quality, and price). A simple depiction of social welfare elements
and connections is shown in Figure 2.3.
In the abstract, a central policy challenge is identifying the ‘best’ social
welfare outcome and then achieving it. A more realistic approach involves
recognizing that there is not a single ‘best’ outcome, because each member
of the system (e.g., conduct authorities, prudential authorities, consumers,
ﬁnancial sectors) values elements differently: what is best for one may be
inferior for others. What can be achieved, however, is the set of possible
outcomes where no member of the system can be made better off without
making other members worse off (Pareto efﬁciency).9 All agree that

Financial Stability

Macro-economic
Growth

Consumer Welfare
Prices, Market Coverage,
Quality

Solvency

Adequate Returns
to Capital

Figure 2.3 Social welfare considerations
Source: Author’s contribution.
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avoiding the inferior outcomes and achieving a Pareto-efﬁcient outcome
where ‘no money is left on the table’ is in the interests of all.
This is more elusive than it may seem. Frequently, members of a complex
system lack awareness of the system’s scope, do not appreciate the extent of
system reactions in response to actions, and do not realize how beneﬁcial
intentions can sometimes propel the system into detrimental outcomes as a
result of unanticipated dynamics. Speciﬁcally, in the markets for insurance
and pensions, there are many challenges within the supervisory structures
that complicate attempts to improve social welfare.

Geographic scope
Virtually every supervisory entity has limited geographic scope, either at the
provincial, state, or regional levels. Welfare implications that lie outside the
scope of geographic oversight rarely receive signiﬁcant attention.

Supervisory mandates
All supervisory bodies have a limited range of activities or outcomes over
which they govern. A very recent example is the separation of prudential
and conduct oversight into separate supervisors at the national level in
several jurisdictions. While this may sharpen the focus of supervisors on
their assigned mandate, it runs the risk of lowering policy awareness and
consideration of important interactions between the pursuits of each policy
mandate.

Uncertain side effects
It is frequently difﬁcult to identify and quantify the unintended side effects
that may result from policy actions. Consequently, it is sometimes expedient
for supervisors to acknowledge the possibility of unintended consequences
and to consider opportunities to minimize them, but ultimately to assign
little weight to collateral effects, relative to achievement of the more proximate policy objectives.

Social welfare tradeoffs
It is difﬁcult for any supervisor to ascertain and implement possible social
preferences for tradeoffs between multiple dimensions of social welfare. For
instance, if greater ﬁnancial stability is obtained at the cost of reduced
sources of guaranteed retirement income, at what point are these multiple
objectives in proper balance with respect to maximizing social welfare? It is
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easiest for supervisors to press forward with the social welfare dimension for
which they are responsible, largely discounting the possible negative effects
on other dimensions as an unquantiﬁed, collateral effect.

Proximate vs. general equilibrium effects
The proximate effects of a new supervisory or regulatory action can be quite
different from the ultimate equilibrium effects after all participants within
the industry networks have acted and reacted to the new order and the
system has reached a new equilibrium with different characteristics.

Examples of Possible Market-Wide Effects
There are many examples where actions taken to advance proximate policy
goals result in signiﬁcant social welfare consequences in other market dimensions. In no case is it clear that the initial policy is not worthwhile, all things
considered, since that type of analysis is not conducted here. Rather, these
examples illustrate the general equilibrium connectedness of policy actions
and the possibility of material consequences elsewhere in the system.

Financial stability and capital allocation
Enhanced supervisory measures at national and global levels to ensure
ﬁnancial stability have required elevated levels of capital of insurers. In
addition, many countries are requiring that the higher capital levels be
effectively held at the subsidiary level within the country administering the
measures. For global insurers, the result is both higher required capital
levels and reduced capital mobility across national borders. These measures
certainly enhance ﬁnancial stability and local solvency, but at a considerable
cost in terms of required cost structure and reduced fungibility of capital
across geographies and markets. The risk-pooling beneﬁt of deploying
capital where it is needed most is largely lost. And higher operating cost
structures can result in elevated product prices and potentially reduced
competition as ﬁrms exit or trim their market presence. Finally, some
globally active ﬁrms, when faced with reduced beneﬁts from global operations through economies of scale and capital fungibility, may choose to
change legal structures, breaking into several locally domiciled entities to
avoid being subject to global requirements.
The earliest capital requirements for systemically important insurers
were developed quickly to minimize the period where the system was still
vulnerable. The Basic Capital Requirement was the ﬁrst developed, and, to
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expedite the process, it was allowed to be somewhat primitive in its formulation.10 While the tradeoff between sophistication and speed may have
been worthwhile for the ﬁrst element of the new capital structure, now the
concern is that some primitive characteristics may be carried forward into
longer-term, more broadly applied measures of required capital such as the
Insurance Capital Standard, which will be applied to all internationally
active insurance groups. If this transpires, there could be severe detrimental
effects resulting in non-level competitive ﬁelds between international and
domestic insurers. This may motivate some insurers to disintegrate, changing legal organizational structure in order to bypass capital markets levied
on IAIGs. The social welfare risk is that market structures will be dramatically altered, risk diversiﬁcation beneﬁts will be lost, and systemic risk will not
be signiﬁcantly reduced.

Conduct policies and market coverage
Conduct authorities in some countries have become very assertive in articulating the obligations of product sellers and the rights of product buyers in
ﬁnancial markets. Some commentators have concluded that the lines governing the relative distribution of responsibilities between buyers and sellers
have moved signiﬁcantly away from the traditional principle of caveat emptor.
As a result, some product providers have decided to exit product markets,
withdraw from serving less proﬁtable customers, or alter product features
and pricing to avoid market conduct risks. The recent UK experience in
advice markets highlights the direct connection between safeguarding the
interests of consumers and ensuring that sufﬁcient market coverage remains
with high-quality products and services that beneﬁt most consumers.

Prudential vs. conduct policies
In a few instances the supervisory responsibility for prudential oversight has
been separated organizationally from the conduct and consumer protection
mandate. Although structures do exist to ensure connections between the
two policy objectives (e.g., cross-membership on supervisory boards), each
supervisory organization will be primarily concerned with the policy area it
oversees. Consequently, prudential goals tend to be advanced with less
regard for conduct implications and vice versa. Examples include the implications for ﬁrm solvency from sizeable conduct ﬁnes, and the elevated cost
structures, higher product prices, and market exits created by very conservative prudential policies.
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Product risks and provision
Under the current methodology adopted by the IAIS/FSB for annuity
products with guarantee features, ﬁrms offering these products are likely
to be designated as systemically important and have more stringent supervisory capital requirements. Both policies result in higher cost structures for
ﬁrms participating in the guaranteed annuity market, causing collateral
effects, including market exit, product redesign, repricing to account for
higher costs, withdrawal from lower proﬁt customer segments, and higher
industry concentration. As the developed world’s population ages and
deﬁned beneﬁt structures taper, the consumer need for alternative sources
of guaranteed income is rising. The enhanced ﬁnancial stability accomplished through higher capital requirements for these products may very
well be fully warranted given some inherent risks, but it also generates a
reduction in other dimensions of social welfare through adverse effects on
product markets and reduced retirement security.

Resolution methodology and capital efﬁciency
The regulations and supervision for orderly recovery and resolution of
systemically important insurers is still a work in progress. Two of the most
complex aspects of developing a credible resolution plan are identifying and
enforcing the rights of the group supervisor (usually located where the ﬁrm
is domiciled) to act as a ‘single point of entry’ in the resolution process. This
lead supervisor status confers the exclusive right to oversee the distressed
organization and make decisions about the uses and location of available
capital, and it is crucial to an orderly resolution process. The alternative
approach, multi-point resolution, allows multiple supervisors with limited
oversight of the ﬁrm to seize capital wherever they may ﬁnd it. Local
supervisors with mandates to protect local policyholders and investors
then have an incentive to secure as much capital as possible immediately,
setting off a rapid-ﬁre competition across supervisors to lock down resources
in periods of distress. In resolution accords, although a single point of entry
mechanism is desirable and usually ofﬁcially adopted, many supervisors
doubt that the resolution protocols would be strictly enforced in the event
of distress. As a result, many supervisors require locally-held capital to
protect the interests of local constituents, effectively raising total capital
requirements and creating multiple local pockets of trapped capital.
These dynamics raise insurer costs, reduce the beneﬁts of global risk diversiﬁcation, and have downstream effects on consumer welfare in the form of
pricing policy, product availability, and higher market concentration.
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Regulatory policies and investment pro-cyclicality
Globally, insurance companies and pensions funds manage $50 trillion in
assets (Bank of England 2014). The asset allocation and investment decisions
of these institutions have decisive inﬂuence on the cost of capital of many
sectors of the global economy. By extension, the regulatory, supervisory, and
accounting policies that inﬂuence these institutions’ investment decisions have
signiﬁcant second-order effects on capital market pricing and cost of capital.
Currently there are substantive differences between European and US
accounting policies with respect to balance sheet valuation methods for
investment assets.11 European conventions largely follow mark-consistent
methods, requiring that balance sheets and capital calculations incorporate
recent market experience and pricing. American conventions differ in
signiﬁcant respects, although there is much recent examination of reconciling US standards to conform more closely to European practices.
A middle ground that has been suggested by some observers would adopt
‘mark-to-funding’ standards, using the asset prices and returns that would
be realized if the owner held the investment asset to full maturity (in the
case of ﬁxed income) (Persaud 2008).
Mark-to-market pricing conventions combined with current regulatory
capital requirements, while beneﬁcially reﬂecting current market values in
balance sheets and regulatory capital measurements, can also create selfreinforcing pro-cyclical policies.12 These dynamics can be magniﬁed during
periods of capital market disruption and distress. As asset prices drop,
insurers’ calculated assets in riskier investments decline, potentially triggering the need to bolster capital through asset sales of riskier assets (and
purchase of low-risk assets to bolster capital positions) into a market already
under some degree of stress. The added selling activity further depresses
prices of riskier assets and increases prices of risk-free assets. The reduced
yield on risk-free assets can then feed back into higher estimated liability
streams. The ﬁnal result is regulated institutions selling large blocks of risky
assets into distressed markets. The mirror image of these feedback loops can
occur during market upturns, raising capital positions during more frothy
markets and encouraging greater risk-taking during market peaks.
One suggested antidote to pro-cyclical policies is to heighten capital
requirements during market upturns and to exercise some measured
degree of supervisory forbearance during market downturns. While potentially beneﬁcial, these policies can also be troublesome. In particular, the
frequency, incidence, and degree of supervisory forbearance can introduce
moral hazard in situations where weaker or poorly managed ﬁrms are given
special leniency, or where the riskier activities of some ﬁrms are forgiven
through ad hoc ﬂexibility granted during downturns.
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Application of bank-oriented prudential standards
within insurance sector
Many of the newly established supervisory entities for insurance are institutions with legacy oversight of the banking sector, including the US Federal
Reserve, central banks in European countries, and the UK Financial Stability
Board (with many central bank constituents). Although similar in some
respects, the insurance and banking sectors have very important differences
in the structure of their balance sheets and attendant risks. Prominent
highlights include (1) the very different nature of assets within banking
(e.g., outstanding loans) and insurance (e.g., investments in a variety of asset
classes); (2) differing types of liabilities within banking (e.g., deposits) and
insurance (e.g., uncertain future contingent payouts); and (3) the differing
degrees of friction and length of time horizons for signiﬁcant movements in
assets and liabilities during periods of distress (e.g., depositor runs in banks
vs. policy lapses/cancellations in insurance). In the early stages of newly
established supervisory oversight, bank-oriented policymakers and supervisors may be inclined to apply identical or largely similar approaches
from the banking sector to the insurance sector. This can result in very
broadly applied designations of systemic importance and ensuing capital
requirements that ensure a very high degree of system safety, but at the cost
of high capital intensity and elevated cost structure that can motivate exit
from product and geographic markets.

Systemic risk methodology, international
capital standards, and ﬁrm structure
At the global level, the methodology for identifying and overseeing
systemically important insurance ﬁrms is determined partly by size, international activity, interconnectedness, and presence in non-traditional,
non-insurance activities (NTNIA). For more broadly applied supervisory
tools, such as the Insurance Capital Standard, the full set of internationally active insurance ﬁrms is within scope, regardless of systemic importance. If the tools and terms for overseeing such ﬁrms are sufﬁciently
onerous, some insurers may prefer to decouple their currently integrated operations into separate legal entities by country, thereby bypassing the more intensive oversight. This disintegration of ﬁrm structure
can result in more locally dedicated capital, loss of scale and scope
economies, and lower risk diversiﬁcation. The net social welfare consequences are not fully known, but signiﬁcant negative spillover must be
considered.
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Risk-weightings applied to sovereign debt
and systemic risk
Much of the risk-weighted capital calculations in current supervisory models
applies a zero weighting to the risk from sovereign bonds issued by developed countries. As such, the risk-weighting applied to different sovereigns
would be invariant with respect to macro-economic health, debt burden,
debt servicing requirements, current budget deﬁcits or surplus, and currency strength. The rationale for this regulatory shortcut is that sovereigns
are unique borrowing entities relative to private organizations that may have
existential threats, and that applying differential risk weights across countries would be fraught with political risk that could unnecessarily complicate
ﬁnancial oversight. Capital markets, however, recognize signiﬁcant differences cross-sectionally and longitudinally in the risk premiums embedded
within the market pricing of sovereign debt.
Insurers and other regulated institutions effectively must hold large quantities of low-risk ﬁxed income investments to match the time horizon of their
liability streams and to satisfy supervisory requirements, and so are effectively bound to hold large investments in sovereign debt. If all sovereign debt
has zero recognized risk under supervisory regimes, but sovereigns exhibit
actual return variation in capital markets pricing, it can be tempting for
ﬁnancial institutions to invest disproportionately in some of the riskiest
sovereign debt, earn higher returns, and beneﬁt from ‘zero-risk’ recognition
by their supervisors. This outcome introduces three types of systemic risk:
(1) institutions create large allocations to some of the riskiest sovereign debt
and are effectively motivated by supervisory standards to do so; (2) ﬁrms’
strategies become more highly correlated as many institutions move in the
same direction, exposing the ﬁnancial system to ampliﬁed negative consequences in response to certain types of shocks; and (3) national governments and domestic ﬁnancial institutions are more likely to experience
signiﬁcant negative shocks simultaneously and become more dependent
on each other for mutual success or possible failure, thus increasing the
‘interconnectedness’ of public and private institutions during periods of
distress. This is a rare example of a scenario where attempts to reduce
systemic risk through speciﬁc policies can actually cause the probability
and severity of systemic events to rise.

Future Challenges
The ways in which insurers are regulated and supervised across products,
geographies, customer segments, and policy objectives matter very signiﬁcantly for ultimate effects on broad measures of social welfare. The
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transmission mechanism ﬂows initially from the implementation of measures meant to achieve proximate policy objectives. It then has both direct
effects on achieving those objectives (often recognized) and indirect effects
on other social welfare measures either directly or through the second-order
responses of supervised institutions (frequently unanticipated or less
acknowledged by policy authorities). Additional challenges arise from
incomplete mandates of supervisory authorities, resulting in either lack of
recognition or less concern about the effects that materialize outside of
ofﬁcial policy mandates. A ﬁnal challenge is created when multiple supervisory authorities with intersecting mandates engage in actions that have
negative action–reaction cycles between supervisory authorities and with the
supervised ﬁnancial institutions.
There are several worthwhile areas where new approaches to policy
implementation could be developed and pursued.

Supervisory coordination across geographies
Supervisory colleges across multiple geographies are an important vehicle
for better communication, coordination, and allowance for the multitude of
effects ﬂowing from supervisory actions. Global structures such as the FSB
and IAIS can be very effective mechanisms for coordinating and harmonizing the implementation of policies. One model approach to improving
social welfare outcomes starts with the Common Framework (ComFrame)
approach taken by the IAIS for instituting supervisory and regulatory standards, which can then be interpreted and modiﬁed at more local levels.

Supervisory/regulatory clarity
Achieving greater clarity in the intent and implementation of supervision
and regulation would be very beneﬁcial both to supervised institutions and
to the achievement of higher social welfare. Greater clarity can be realized
in articulating desired future end states, paths to achieve them, and negative
scenarios to avoid. At a more tactical level, signiﬁcant improvements can be
made in greater standardization of supervisory approaches, coordination
across multiple authorities, reduced duplication of effort, stability of the
supervisory structures, and movement toward a more level competitive
landscape across geographies.

Improved understanding of outcomes
All participants within the networked ﬁnancial system would beneﬁt
from greater understanding of the interconnectedness of their actions:
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TABLE 2.1.

Implications for insurance/pensions/retirement security

• Annuity provision, pricing features, guarantees, innovation, availability
• Capital market pricing volatility and stability
• Market coverage of products, customer segments, geographies
• Financial advice provision and coverage
• Transfer of longevity risk
• Pension settlement
Source: Author’s contribution.

policymakers, regulators, supervisors, ﬁnancial institutions. In particular,
enhanced understanding of network dynamics can occur in several areas:
(1) ﬁrst-order responses to actions; (2) second-order effects that arise from
an action–reaction cycle among members of the network; and (3) consequences that lie outside supervisory mandates.

Broader allowance for several dimensions
of social welfare
Finally, it would be very helpful, although admittedly challenging, for policymakers, regulators, and supervisors to acknowledge and allow for effects
of their actions on dimensions of social welfare that may have a more
complex causal chain and that lie outside their ofﬁcial mandates. This is
particularly important for connections to long-term ﬁnancial and retirement security that depend on adequate returns to capital, ﬁnancial stability,
macro-economic growth, the ability to pool and diversify risks efﬁciently,
and reliable, low-cost sources of guaranteed income (see Table 2.1).

Conclusion
The next decades will be decisive in determining whether the large aging
population cohort in developed countries will be able to navigate a new
retirement system that relies both on adequate levels of ﬁnancial resources
and the ability to pool and allocate speciﬁc risks efﬁciently across institutions
and society. The supervisory structures and policies overseeing the insurance, asset management, and pensions sectors will be a signiﬁcant contributor to whether and to what extent this navigation is successful.

Glossary of Terms
ACP
AFM

French Autorité de Contrôl Prudentiel
Netherlands Authority for Financial Markets
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BAFIN
BCR
BHC
CBI
DNB
EIOPA
FCA
FINMA
FIO
FSB
FSOC
GSII
HLA
IAIG
IAIS
ICS
NAIC
NTNIA
OSFI
PRA
RRP
SIFI

Germany Federal Financial Supervisory Authority
Basic Capital Requirement
Bank Holding Company
Central Bank of Ireland
Dutch National Bank
European Insurance and Occupational Pension Authority
Financial Conduct Authority, UK
Swiss Financial Markets Supervisory Authority
Federal Insurance Ofﬁce, US
Financial Stability Board
Financial Stability Oversight Council
Global Systemically Important Insurer
Higher Loss Absorbency
Internationally Active Insurance Groups
International Association of Insurance Supervisors
Insurance Capital Standard
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, US
Non-Traditional, Non-Insurance Activities
Ofﬁce of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions
Prudential Regulatory Authority, UK
Recovery and Resolution Plans
Systemically Important Financial Institutions

Endnotes
1. The regional Federal Reserve ofﬁce in which the insurer is domiciled becomes the
primary overseer of that ﬁnancial institution.
2. Voting members of FSOC include Secretary of the Treasury, Chairman of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Director
of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), Chairman of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), Chairperson of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), Chairperson of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC), Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), Chairman of the
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), and an independent member with
insurance expertise who is appointed by the President and conﬁrmed by the senate
for a six-year term. Non-voting members include the Director of the Ofﬁce of
Financial Research (OFR), the Director of the Federal Insurance Ofﬁce (FIO), a
state insurance commissioner designated by the state insurance commissioners, a
state banking commissioner designated by the state banking commissioners, and a
state securities commissioner designated by the state securities commissioners.
3. See, for instance, Van Hulle (this volume, Chapter 5) for coverage of Solvency II
regulations in greater depth.
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4. See, for instance, Reid and Waters (this volume, Chapter 6) for in-depth coverage of issues of ﬁnancial stability and systemic risk.
5. Regulatory issues around solvency are addressed in greater depth in Van Hulle
(this volume, Chapter 5).
6. The IAIS is also a member of the FSB, constituting a formal connection between
the two organizations.
7. ‘The Executive Committee currently has three U.S. members, two from the
NAIC and one from Treasury’s Federal Insurance Ofﬁce (FIO). The North
American region is limited to ﬁve seats on the Executive Committee. Canada
and Mexico each have one’ (Festa 2013).
8. This is sometimes referred to as a general equilibrium outcome, and the beforeversus-after comparison as comparative statics.
9. Pareto efﬁciency, or Pareto optimality, is a state of allocation of resources in
which it is impossible to make any one individual better off without making at
least one individual worse off.
10. This included not incorporating (1) the risk-reducing beneﬁts of asset-liability
matching; (2) risk diversiﬁcation advantages of deploying capital across uncorrelated geographies, product lines, and customer segment; and (3) levying a
simple capital surcharge based on 12% of income generated from asset management operations.
11. See, for instance, Maurer et al. (this volume, Chapter 3).
12. The Procyclicality Working Group deﬁnes procyclicality along two dimensions:
First, in the short term, the tendency to invest in a way that exacerbates
market movements and contributes to asset price volatility, which can in
turn contribute to asset price feedback loops. Asset price volatility has the
potential to affect participants across ﬁnancial markets, as well as to have
longer-term macroeconomic effects; and
Second, in the medium term, as a tendency to invest in line with asset
price and economic cycles, so that willingness to bear risk diminishes in
periods of stress and increases in upturns. A tendency by insurance companies and pension funds to invest procyclically in the medium term might
deepen the troughs and exaggerate the peaks of asset price or economic
cycles in a way that is potentially detrimental to ﬁnancial stability and longterm economic growth (Bank of England 2014: 2).
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